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Abstract
This paper analyzes how the crisis in Asia spread during the second half of 1997.  We cast our net
wide and investigate several possible trade and financial linkages among the Asian economies. We
construct a series of “contagion vulnerability indices,” which capture the various manifestations of
exposure through trade and finance to the initial crisis country and contrast the predictions of this
index to actual outcomes during the Asian crisis. We pay attention to the reversal in bank lending
of Japanese and European banks, which were lending heavily to emerging Asia on the eve of the
crisis.  Daily interest rate and exchange rate data for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South
Korea, and Thailand are used to assess whether the patterns of causality and interdependence
changed as the crisis spread, as well as to answer question of whether interdependence among the
Asian economies has changed as the result of the crisis. 
1 The authors wish to thank Takatoshi Ito, Anne Krueger, Mahani Zainal-Abidin, Eiji Ogawa, and
conference participants at the NBER’s 10th Annual East Asia Seminar on Economics, Hawaii,
June 10-12, 1999 for helpful comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Alejandro Guerson
and Rafael Romeu for excellent research assistance.
     1See, for instance, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995).
     2 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) on this issue.
     3 See Calvo and Mendoza (998) and Chari and Kehoe 
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I. Introduction
There have been several major episodes of “contagious currency crises” during the 1990s.
The first of these was the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992-93.  Explanations of
why currency instability spread through Europe frequently stressed the interdependence of ERM
countries via extensive trade in goods and services.1  Y t, th  ERM crisis was later followed by the
Mexican peso crisis in late 1994, with its “Tequila effect” on Argentina and other Latin American
countries, and the Russian crisis of 1998, which paralyzed capital flows to emerging markets. 
There is ample evidence that trade links are not capable of explaining why Argentina was so hard
hit by the devaluation of the Mexican peso, as there is minimal bilateral trade between Argentina
and Mexico and there is little scope for competition in a common third market.2  Similarly,
Russia’s importance in world trade is hardly capable of explaining why emerging markets came
under such duress following its devaluation and default in August 1998. The absence of obvious
trade links in these episodes and the growing importance of financial markets has led academics,
policy makers, and the financial press to search for other possible explanations of contagion.  Some
of these explanations have relied on herding behavior in the part of investors.3 O her stories have
suggested that contagion can arise through exposure to common lenders, be it hedge funds (as in
Calvo, 1998) or banks (as in Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998).
The focus of this paper is to analyze how the crisis in Asia spread during the second half of
1997.  We cast our net wide and investigate several possible trade and financial linkages among the
     4 Besides Thailand, the affected countries are taken to include Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and South Korea.
     5 The Philippines had a much lower exposure to Japanese banks.
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Asian economies which may help explain why a devaluation in a relatively small country in the
region (i.e., Thailand) had such widespread regional consequences.  We proceed to construct a
series of “contagion vulnerability indices,” which capture the various manifestations of exposure
through trade and finance to the initial crisis country.  We contrast the predictions of this
vulnerability index to the actual outcomes during the Asian crisis and compare these results to
other recent crisis episodes in emerging markets. We also pay particular attention to the role
played by Japanese and European banks, which were lending heavily to emerging Asia on the eve
of the crisis.4  Daily interest rate for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and
Thailand. and exchange rate data is used to assess whether the patterns of causality and
interdependence changed as the crisis spread as well as to answer the broader question of whether
interdependence among selected Asian economies has changed as the result of the crisis. Our main
findings can be summarized as follows:
First, as regards the propagation of shocks across national borders during the Asian crisis,
the behavior of foreign banks, particularly Japanese banks who began to drastically curtail their
lending to the affected Asian countries following the Thai devaluation, appears to play a role in
spreading the crisis particularly to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea.5  The large exposure of
European banks to South Korea and their subsequent retrenchment further deepens the regional
liquidity crunch.
     6 Obviously, differences across countries in how the crisis is managed by policy makers can go
a long way toward differences in the severity and duration of the crisis.
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Second, only Malaysia and South Korea, in that order, appear to have any significant trade
link to Thailand.  However, these trade links are indirect, through exports to a common third party. 
Indeed, there is relatively little bilateral trade among these emerging Asian economies.  Thus, the
spread of crisis to Indonesia and the Philippines cannot be explained through interdependence
arising from a substantial volume of trade in goods and services.
Third, the “contagion vulnerability indices” do reasonably well in anticipating which
countries were most vulnerable to contagion in three recent crises episodes, which include the
Mexican 1994 devaluation, Brazil’s crisis in early 1999, as well as the Asian episode.  The indices,
however, are silent as to the severity of the these contagion effects.  For example, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and South Korea are all identified as potential candidates of spillovers from Thailand.
Yet Indonesia is shown, ex-ante, as the one with the least intensive linkages to Thailand; ex-post, it
was the most severe crisis of the three.6
Fourth, the evidence from the daily data suggests that the patterns of causality and
interdependence do change during the course of the crisis, as turbulence in affected countries, like
Indonesia begin to have additional feedback effects on the other countries, including the initial
crisis country, Thailand.  Furthermore, there is a marked difference in pre- and post- crisis
interest rates and exchange rate linkages among the countries in our sample.  Prior to the crisis,
there is little evidence of systematic causality or interdependence among these five countries; the
post-crisis patterns are markedly different, particularly for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand,
all which show a much greater degree of dependence on external shocks.
     7 See, for instance, Gerlach and Smets and Glick and Rose (1999).
     8  See, for example Frankel and Schmukler (1998) and Calvo (1998).
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Lastly, Malaysia’s interest rates remain uninfluenced by shocks to other interest rates in the
region in the post crisis sample. Possibly, this result may be due to the presence of extensive capital
controls--and issue which merits further scrutiny.
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the patterns in Japanese,
European, and U.S. bank lending to emerging Asia and analyzes the behavior of foreign bank
lending as the crisis unfolds.  Section III discusses trade linkages and other financial channels of
contagion. In this section, “contagion vulnerability indices” are developed and used to analyze and
compare recent crisis episodes.  In Section IV, we study the issue of cross-country
interdependence among daily interest rate and exchange rate shocks and how international linkages
may have changed during the post-crisis period.  The last section presents some brief concluding
remarks.
II. Bank Lending and Contagion in Asia: Stylized Evidence
Much of the recent literature on contagion has suggested that trade links are a vehicle for
the transmission of currency crises across national borders.7  Othe  r cent papers on the subject
have focused on the role that capital markets play in spreading turbulence internationally.8  Yet,
nearly all this literature has ignored the role that banks can play in transmitting disturbances across
countries.  This channel of transmission is straightforward. Through its loan portfolio a bank may
be exposed to a country that has a financial crisis. If the crisis occurs, it impacts the bank’s balance
sheet; the bank is faced with the need to re-balance its portfolio.  To make up for the deterioration
     9 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998). 
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in the quality of its loans, the bank may shift away from lending and increase its holdings of
government bonds.  Other countries which were borrowing from the affected bank will be
vulnerable to a cutback in their lines of credit.  Furthermore, if these countries’ loan contracts were
of short maturity and the bank’s re-balancing needs are significant, the initial crisis could trigger
large capital outflows from the other borrowers.  That is, not only the bank may be unwilling to
extend new credits to the other borrowers, it may refuse to roll over their existing loans--hence,
the capital outflow.  If the capital flow reversal is sufficiently large and abrupt, it could spark a
financial crisis in one or more of the other borrowers.  This type of problem is particularly acute if
the borrowers were heavily dependent on that bank and do not have immediate recourse to
alternative sources of financing. The bank’s inability or unwillingness to lend may be compounded
by the requirement that banks must provision for bad loans. 
In an earlier paper, we examined the potential for contagion through exposure to a
common lender.9  We found evidence that common bank lenders have played a significant role in
the spread of currency crises--indeed, the bank lending channel outperforms trade channels in
explaining the vulnerability of a country to contagion.  Using a different approach and
methodology, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) also find evidence of an important common
lender channel.  
Contagion during the Exchange Rate Mechanism crises of 1992 and 1993 in Europe and in
Argentina and Brazil following the devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 appear to have little to
do with the withdrawal of a common bank creditor.  High and rising international interest rates and
poor economic fundamentals have been blamed for the wave of currency and banking crises that
     10 See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996).
     11 Emerging Asia comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.
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swept developing countries (particularly in Latin America) in the early 1980s.  Yet, badly burned
by Mexico’s default in August of 1982, U.S. banks were rapidly retrenching from the emerging
world.  The drive to reduce loan exposure was most acute for Latin America, which depended
almost exclusively on U.S. banks.  A more recent example of the role of banks in propagating
disturbances internationally can be found in the Asian crisis of 1997.  The remainder of this section
is devoted to this  issue.
1. Banks and contagion in Asia
International capital had been pouring into much of Asia, most notably Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand, throughout most of the 1990s.  Other emerging markets, particularly the largest
countries in Latin America, experienced a similar surge in capital inflows.10  A key difference
among the two regions, however, was that an important share of capital inflows to Latin America
came through portfolio bond and equity flows while in Asia bank lending loomed large, particularly
in the two years preceding the crisis.  As shown in Table 1, lending to emerging Asia expanded by
xx percent from June 1995 to June 1997.11 There were two factors behind this sharp growth in
bank credit.  Part of the rise in lending was owing to the European banks’ goal to achieve a higher
profile in emerging markets and, particularly, in South Korea.  But much of the lending boom,
especially in the case of Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, was owing to a rapid expansion in
credit from Japanese banks.  Faced with a slumping economy and little domestic loan demand,
     12 Most of the remaining one-third was going to China.
     13 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) for a comparison of these episodes.
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Japanese banks increasingly looked overseas to the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia
as potential borrowers.
Table 2 presents the distribution of lending of U.S., Japanese, and European banks to
emerging Asia.  Three features are worth noting.  First, U.S. bank exposure to Asia was modest
on the eve of the crisis; emerging Asia amounted to about US $24 billion (Table 1) and only
accounted for 20 percent of all U.S. bank lending to developing countries (Table 2). Second, and
by way of contrast, Japanese banks were lending four times as much as U.S. banks (i.e., US $97
billion) to emerging Asia; the five crisis countries listed in Table 2 accounted for two-third of all
loans to emerging markets.12  Third, Japanese banks’ were most exposed to Thailand--which is the
first country to experience a crisis.  Indeed, the extent of their exposure is similar to that of U.S.
banks to Mexico in 1982.13  Fourth, European bank lending to Emerging Asia was also significant
and accounted for about a half of all their lending to emerging markets; South Korea alone
accounted for 40 percent of their lending to the developing world.
Fifth, Japanese banks were the first to pull out of emerging Asia. Between June and
December of 1997, lending by Japanese banks fell by 10 percent, while lending by European banks
actually rose slightly.  This is not surprising in light of the previous discussion. Japanese banks
were most exposed to Thailand; European and U.S. banks were most exposed to South Korea. 
The Thai devaluation occurs in early July, while South Korea abandons its defense of the won in
mid-November.  By June 1998, however the reduction in lending to emerging Asia was across the
board.  US bank lending falls by a cumulative 30 percent, but this represents a decline of about US
     14 This methodology is described in some detail in Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998),
Kaminsky (1998), and Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (1999).
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$5 billion. The 24 percent decline in Japanese bank lending in June 1997-98, however, translates
into a reduction of about US $26 billion.
The previous observations suggest that, even if the banks were not the immediate trigger of
financial contagion, their actions certainly made the spillovers, first from Thailand and later from
South Korea far more severe than they would otherwise be.  In the following section, we construct 
a composite contagion vulnerability index–exposure to a common bank creditor figures
prominently in this index.
III.  A Contagion “Vulnerability” Index
In this section, we provide a brief review of the “signals” approach that we will use to
assess the probability of a “contagious” currency crisis.  This methodology was first used to
analyze the performance of a variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators around “twin
crises” (i.e., the joint occurrences of currency and banking crises) in Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999).14
In the analysis that follows, we focus on a sample of 20 countries over the period 1970 to
1998.  The countries in our sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark,
Finland, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,
Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  As an out of sample exercise, we apply this approach to analyze
South Korea’s vulnerability to contagion during recent episodes of global financial turmoil.
While the preceding section stressed the key role played by foreign banks in spreading the
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crises throughout Asia during 1997, in this section we develop a contagion vulnerability index that
also allows for other types of links across countries.  Specifically, we consider both bilateral and
third-party trade links as well as contagion arising from other financial channels.
In order to implement the signals approach to analyze contagion, however, we need to
clarify a minimum number of concepts which will be used throughout the analysis.
1. Defining currency crises
A currency crisis is defined as a situation in which an attack on the currency leads to
substantial reserve losses and/or to a sharp depreciation of the currency--if the speculative attack is
ultimately successful. This definition of currency crisis has the advantage that it is comprehensive
enough to capture not only speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates (e.g., Thailand’s experience
prior to July 2, 1997)  but also attacks that force a large devaluation beyond the established rules
of a crawling-peg regime or an exchange rate band (e.g., Indonesia’s widening of the band prior to
its floatation of the rupiah on August 14, 1997.)  Since reserve losses also count, the index also
captures unsuccessful speculative attacks.
  We constructed an index of currency market turbulence as a weighted average of
exchange rate changes and reserve changes. Interest rates were excluded as many emerging
markets in our sample had interest rate controls through much of the sample.
The index, I, is a weighted average of the rate of change of the exchange rate, Ä /e, and of
reserves, ÄR/R, with weights such that the two components of the index have equal sample
volatilities
                  I = (Äe/e) - (óe/óR)*( ÄR/R) (1)
     15 While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic for a country with low-to-moderate
inflation, a devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace during hyperinflation. A single index
for the countries that had hyperinflation episodes would miss sizable devaluations and reserve
losses in the moderate inflation periods, since the historic mean is distorted by the high-inflation
episode. To avoid this, we divided the sample according to whether inflation in the previous six
months was higher than 150% and then constructed an index for each subsample. 
     16 This is the definition used in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1998) and Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1998).
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where óe is the standard deviation of the rate of change of the exchange rate and óR is the s andard
deviation of the rate of change of reserves. Since changes in the exchange rate enter with a positive
weight and changes in reserves have a negative weight attached, readings of this index that were
three standard deviations or more above the mean were cataloged as crises. For countries in the
sample that had hyperinflation, the construction of the index was modified.15 As note  in earlier
studies which use the signals approach, the dates of the crises map well onto the dates obtained if
one were to rely exclusively on events, such the closing of the exchange markets or a change in the
exchange rate regime, to define crises.
2. Defining contagion 
As noted earlier, the term contagion has been used to mean different things across studies.
In this paper, contagion refers to the case where knowing that there is a currency crisis elsewhere
increases the probability of a crisis at home.16  We are interested in understanding the channels of
transmission of what we call “fundamentals-based contagion,” which arises when countries are
linked via trade or finance.  Masson (1999), for example, calls this type of phenomenon a
“spillover” and the term “contagion” in his glossary is reserved for cases where there are no trade
or financial links.  In these latter cases, shifts in investor sentiment or herding spread the crisis
     17 Details on the criteria used to define the clusters are given in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998).
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across national borders.  
Since what we are interested in explaining is how turbulence is transmitted across countries
which are connected by trade or finance and in assessing which of these links are most important, it
matters greatly how we define “elsewhere.”  As in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), we define
“elsewhere” by grouping the countries in our sample into various clusters.  As noted in Section II,
an important source of “fundamentals-based contagion” in the Asian crisis was countries’ exposure
to a common bank lender.  We identify two distinct bank clusters in our sample; one of these
clusters is made up of countries that borrow primarily from U.S. banks, while a second bank
cluster consists of countries where an important share of their borrowing is concentrated among
Japanese banks.
The growing practice of cross-market hedging in recent years also suggests that countries
which have (for whatever reason) exhibited a moderately positive correlation of asset returns (with
the crisis country) and have relatively liquid markets may be vulnerable to contagion via cross-
market hedges.  We identify two high-correlation clusters in our sample in Asia and Latin America. 
A competitive devaluation story, as in Gerlach and Smets (1996), suggests that a currency
crisis in one country may lead to a devaluation in a second country if the two countries engage in a
significant amount of bilateral trade.  In a similar vein, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), stress
that competitive devaluation pressures may arise even if  two countries do not directly trade with
one another. Such pressures may be present if the two countries are competing in a common third
market.  
The countries in each of clusters are listed in Table 4.17  On the basis of the information in
     18 It is important to note that this is not an exhaustive analysis of all possible financial sector
links. For instance, Brazil and Russia are directly impacted by the Korean crisis, as Korean
financial intermediaries sold their holdings of Brazilian and Russian debt (see Calvo and Reinhart,
1996 for examples and discussion of other potential links.)
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Table 4, we can construct a rough index of vulnerability to “fundamentals-based contagion” for
each country in the sample at each point in time.  Consider the case of the Asian crisis, which
began on July 2, 1997 with the devaluation of the Thai baht.  To assess how the Thai devaluation
could potentially affect other countries, one could simply count the number of common clusters
through which a country is exposed to Thailand.  For example, Malaysia is in the same bank cluster
as Thailand, as well as in the same high-correlation and third-party trade cluster--a total of three. 
The Philippines, is also a part of the same third-party trade and Asian high-correlation cluster but it
is not a part of the Japanese bank cluster--a total of two.  Indonesia shares the same high-
correlation and Japanese bank cluster with Thailand--a total of two.  South Korea borrows from
Japanese banks, it is part of the Asian third-party trade cluster, but asset returns correlation with
Thailand is low--also a total of two. While Argentina, for example, is not exposed to Thailand via
any of the financial or trade links analyzed here.18  On th  basis of this simple tally, one would
conclude that Malaysia is the most vulnerable to “fundamentals-based contagion” from Thailand
and Argentina the least.  But this simple tally does not allow us to rank the relative vulnerability of
Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea, as they all share two, albeit different, clusters with
Thailand.  In the remainder of this section, we describe an approach that allows us to assign
different weights in a “contagion vulnerability index” to the different trade an financial links; the
weights will depend on the accuracy of these links in predicting the incidence of contagious crises.
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3. Signals, noise, and crises probabilities
A crisis elsewhere may or may not be a reliable “signal” of a future crisis at home.  A
summary of the possible outcomes is presented in the following two-by-two matrix,
Crisis occurs in the
following 24 months
No crisis occurs in the
following 24 months
Signal =1, if there is a
crisis elsewhere
A B
No signal=0, if no crisis
elsewhere
C D
A perfect indicator would only have entries in cells A and D. Hence, with this matrix we
can define several useful concepts which we will use to evaluate the predictive ability of each of
the clusters. 
We begin by calculating, for a given sample, the unconditional probability of crisis,
P© = (A+C)/(A+B+C+D). (2)
If  knowing that there is a crisis elsewhere helps predict a crisis at home, then it can be expected
that the probability a of crisis, conditional on a signal, P(C*S), is greater than the unconditional
probability. Where
P(C*S) = A/(A+B). (3)
Formally,
P(C*S) - P© > 0. (4)
If crisis elsewhere is not a “noisy” indicator (prone to sending false alarms), then there are
relatively few entries in cell B and P(C*S). 1.  But since elsewhere is defined differently for each
of the clusters, their forecasting track record will differ.
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We can also define the noise-to-signal ratio, N/S as,
N/S = [B(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]. (5)
In the remainder of this section, we employ these concepts to provide evidence on the relative
merits in anticipating crises of the trade and finance clusters.
Table 5 presents the results from this exercise for each of the clusters.  As noted in
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), contagion appears to be a highly non-linear process, irrespective of
which country grouping scheme is used.  If a quarter to a half of the countries in a given cluster
have a crisis, the probability of a crisis at home does not increase by much; this is shown under the
rows labeled 25 to 50 percent. Yet, if more than one half of the countries in the cluster have a
crisis, the probability of a crisis at home increases dramatically.  This nonlinearity is evident in the
marked declines in the noise-to-signal ratios as the proportion of countries affected by crises
increases.  The decline in the noise-to-signal ratio is most dramatic for the Latin American bilateral
trade cluster, which falls from 2.34 to 0.08.  This sharp improvement in forecasting accuracy is
also evident in its marginal predictive ability, P(C*S) - P(C).  The common bank lender cluster has
the lowest noise-to-signal ratio while that third party trade cluster has the highest.  While assessing
the predictive ability of the individual clusters is a useful exercise to discriminate among competing
explanations of contagion, countries which are linked in trade are also often linked in finance.  This
implies that multiple channels of contagion may be operating at once. To examine exposure to
contagion via a variety of channels we now turn to the construction of a composite vulnerability
index.
4. Trade and financial clusters, and a composite contagion index
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Kaminsky (1998) and Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show how to construct a
“composite index” to gauge the probability of a crisis conditioned on multiple signals from various
indicators (i.e., economic fundamentals); the more reliable indicators receive a higher weight in this
composite index. This methodology can be readily applied to construct a composite contagion
vulnerability index.
In weighing individual indicators, a good argument can be made for by eliminating from
our list of potential leading indicators those variables which had a noise-to-signal ratio above unity;
this is tantamount to stating that their marginal forecasting ability P(C*S) of zero or less.  Applying
this criterion to our results, we would focus on the case where more than 50 percent of the
countries in the cluster are experiencing a crisis.  As shown in Table 5, the highest noise-to-signal
ratio is 0.57, well below unity--but the track record of the signals in each of the clusters is far from
uniform.  Thus, we weigh the signals by the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratios reported in Tables
5.
Formally, we construct the following composite indicator,
In (6) it is assumed that there are n different indicators (i.e., clusters). Each cluster has a
differentiated ability to forecast crises and, as before, this ability can be summarized by the
noise-to-signal ratio, here denoted by ùj.  St 
j is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
univariate indicator, S j crosses its critical threshold and is thus signaling a crisis and zero
otherwise. As before, the noise-to-signal ratio is calculated under the assumption that an indicator
     19 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) for details on the pattern of trade.
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issues a correct signal if a crisis occurs within the following 24 months. All other signals are 
considered false alarms.
The maximum value that this composite vulnerability index could score is 30.9 if a country
belonged to the same four clusters as the crisis country.  This score is a simple sum of the inverse
of the noise-to-signal.
5. Evidence from three recent crisis episodes
 We now consider, on the basis of the trade and financial sector linkages discussed here,
which countries would have been classified as vulnerable to contagion during three recent episodes
of currency crises in emerging markets.  The first of these episodes begins with the devaluation of
the Mexican peso in December 1994.
On the heels of the Mexican devaluation, Argentina and Brazil were the countries to come
under the greatest speculative pressure.  In a matter of a few weeks in early 1995, the central bank
of Argentina lost about 20 percent of its foreign exchange reserves and bank deposits fell by about
18 percent, as capital fled the country.  Such a severe outcome could hardly be attributed to trade
linkages and  competitive devaluation pressures, as Argentina does not trade with Mexico on a
bilateral basis nor does it compete with Mexican exports in a common third market.19  In the case
of Brazil, the speculative attack was more brief, although the equity market sustained sharp losses.
Both of these countries record high readings in their vulnerability index following the Mexican
devaluation.  While the effects on Asia of the Mexican crisis were relatively mild, the country
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which encountered most turbulence in the region was the Philippines, which also registers a
relatively high vulnerability score.
In the case of the Thai crisis, Malaysia shares both trade and finance links with Thailand.
For the other Asian countries the potential channels of transmission are fewer. As noted earlier, the
Philippines, is a part of the same third-party trade cluster as Thailand, which receives a weight of
1.75, (i.e. 1/0.57) in the composite index; it is also part of the Asian high-correlation cluster, which
receives a weight of 2.57 (i.e. 1/0.39) in the index.  Indonesia shares the same high-correlation
cluster with Thailand and it is a part of the Japanese bank cluster, which receives a weight of 14.08
(i.e., 1/0.07).  Hence, as shown in Table 6, Indonesia’s and the Philippines contagion vulnerability
index score 16.65 and 4.32, respectively.  South Korea, as noted in Section II, also borrowed
heavily from Japanese banks.  Accordingly its exposure to Thailand came more from having a
common lender than from conventional competitive trade pressures.
The most recent of these emerging market crises was Brazil’s devaluation of the real in
early 1999.  Not surprisingly, Argentina which has both trade (Mercosur) and financial linkages
with Brazil shows the highest vulnerability; other Mercosur countries come close in suit.
IV. Contagion and Interdependence: Interest Rates and Exchange Rates
The preceding discussion has suggested that, even in the absence of any shifts in market
sentiment or herding behavior on the part of investors, there are multiple reasons why a crisis in
one country may have important repercussions on other countries which are exposed to the crisis
through financial or trade arrangements.  Yet these fundamental channels of crisis transmission are
not likely to emerge or disappear quickly.  Developing mutually satisfactory trade arrangements or
     20 See Calvo and Mendoza (1998).
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building close ties with possible creditors may take time and is not likely to change dramatically
from one moment to the next.  For example, as shown in Table 2, countries which were in the
Japanese bank cluster before the crisis remain so after the crisis; a similar statement can be made
about the U.S. borrower group.  
A proximate way to explore whether vulnerability to “true contagion,” that is
interdependence that cannot be accounted for by the kinds of conventional trade or finance links
that we have focussed on thus far, may be to examine causal patterns (or interdependence) among
the affected countries in market-determined variables such as interest rates, exchange rates, and
stock returns.  One possible explanation of contagion has to do with the “wake-up call hypothesis”
(see Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart, 1999), which suggests that the initial crisis serves as a
wake-up call, leading investors to reassess the risks of other countries which share some of the
vulnerabilities with the crisis country--irrespective of whether they have a common bank lender or
are linked in trade.  Alternatively, herding may arise even when investors are rational if verifying
rumors (or information in general) is costly.20  If rumors become more frequent in the aftermath of
a crisis, this may impart greater interdependence or increased comovement among financial
indicators across countries.
1. Methodology issues
To examine whether there is greater interdependence or unidirectional causal links among
five of the affected Asian countries following the financial crisis that began with the July 2, 1997
20
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devaluation of the Thai baht, we assembled daily data on domestic interest rates and exchange
rates for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phillippines, South Korea and Thailand.  The data begins on
January 1st of 1996 and runs through July 1999.  Hence, there a roughly comparable number of
observations prior to the crisis (392 observations) and following the crises (334 observations.)  We
employ a simple vector autoregression (VAR) framework which treats all variables as potentially
endogenous and include ten lags of each of the variables in the system.  Omitting time subscripts, a
representative equation for domestic interest rates in Indonesia (denoted by the subscript I) in this
five-equation system is given by,
 
The subscripts m, p, sk, and t refer to Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand,
respectively.  The lag operators are the A’s and å’s denote the random shocks.  A comparable
system was estimated for daily changes in the exchange rate (in percent).  For each block of
regressors we conducted F- and log-likelihood ratio tests that tested the null hypothesis of no
causal relationship.
2. Interest rate and exchange rates links: Evidence from Asia
Table 7 reports the results for interest rates; the detailed test statistics and their associated
probability values are presented in Appendix Tables A.1-A.4.  The columns “cause” the rows; an N
denotes that the null hypothesis of no causality was not rejected while a Y indicates rejection of the
null hypothesis at a 5 percent level of significance or higher. For example, the top row, which
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summarizes the results for Indonesia for the January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997 period shows four N
entries, indicating that interest rates in the four remaining countries in the system had no systematic
influence on Indonesian interest rates. The last column of Table 7 tallies the number of significant
entries. Table 8 summarizes in comparable manner the results for the daily exchange rate changes.
Several features of the pre- and post-crisis results for interest rate patterns are worth
noting. First, for the pre-crisis sample none of the regressors (other than lags of the dependent
variable) are statistically significant at standard confidence levels.  S cond, th  post crisis period is
quite different in that regard with a greater degree of interdependence among the countries. 
Fluctuation in Thai and Philippine interest rates significantly influence interest rates in Indonesia.
Likewise interest rates in Indonesia influence the Philippines and Thailand. Third,
interdependence was most intense during the period immediately following the Thai devaluation
and the subsequent devaluation of the Korean won on November 17, 1997. 
Fourth, Malaysian interest rates are not significantly affected by interest rate developments
in the other four countries in the full post-crisis period.  One could speculate this insulation may be
due to the introduction of exchange controls in September 1998. Indeed, prior to the imposition of
exchange restrictions Malaysian interest rates were influenced by other countries’ interest rates
during the height of the crisis in July 1997-April 1998.
Fifth, no clean unidirectional causality pattern from Thailand to the other countries
emerges from this exercise--not even in the earlier stages of the crisis.  For the period July 2, 1997-
November 16, 1997 there is causality from Thailand to Indonesia and South Korea but not to the
Philippines or Malaysia.  Indeed, as the crisis progresses causal relationships among the countries
most often go both ways.
     21 See Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and (1998) for applications to Latin America and Africa,
respectively.
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Turning to the patterns that emerge from performing the same exercise on daily exchange
rate changes there are important similarities with the results for interest rates. Fi st, for the pre-
crisis sample none of the regressors (other than lags of the dependent variable) are statistically
significant at standard confidence levels--as was the case for interest rates. Second, during the
post-crisis period there is a much a greater degree of interdependence among the exchange rates of
the five countries--even greater than that exhibited by interest rates. 
Third, exchange rates in the two smaller countries in the group, the Philippines and
Thailand are the most influenced by exchange rate developments else where in the region.  In the
case of the Philippines, all four exchange rate (baht, ringgit, rupiah, and the won) are statistically
significant in the regressions; for Thailand nearly all.  This may be consistent with evidence of
“large neighbor effects” on capital flow movements.21  Fourth, changes in the Korean won (South
Korea is the largest country of this group) significantly influence the remaining four currencies in
the post crisis period.
Taken together, these results suggest that interdependence among currencies and interest
rates among these five Asian economies has increased in the wake of the financial crisis.  Given
that trade and financial linkages have not changed markedly during this recent period, one
interpretation for this greater interdependence is that in the aftermath of the crisis financial market
participants are more likely to lump these economies into one group than they did previously.
V. Thoughts on Further Research
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This paper has suggested that financial sector links have played an increasingly important
role in the 1990s in transmitting disturbances across national boundaries.  Many of the channels of
transmission (i.e., cross market hedges) and many of the agents (i.e. hedge funds and mutual funds)
are still relatively novel, particularly in the context of emerging market finance.  As such, these
potential channels of interdependence merit much closer scrutiny both at the theoretical and
empirical dimension.  Microeconomic data at the institutional level is certainly bound to increase
our understanding of the role played by capital markets and their new instruments in an
increasingly globalized environment.
In addition, while banks in financial centers have a long history of lending to the developing
world and booms and busts in such lending are not a new phenomenon, banks’ lending strategies
and decisions are still not well understood.  Foreign banks’ lending practices may be a source of
instability to emerging markets when the shock originates at the center, as it did with the sharp rise
in U.S. interest rates in October 1979, or when the shock originates in the difficulties faced by a
relatively small borrower (i.e., Thailand) to whom the banks have substantial exposure.  To gain
insights into this phenomenon, it is necessary to go beyond the aggregate macroeconomic data and
analyze the response of individual bank balance sheets and lending decisions to the kinds of shocks
discussed in this paper.  This analysis is not only useful to better understand past booms and busts
in foreign lending--it is of increasing relevance to anticipate future ones.  Indeed, given the trend in
many emerging markets toward greater openness in their financial sectors and a rising presence of
foreign or “truly international” banks, the issue of what role these banks play in transmitting
disturbances across borders is of increasing relevance.
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Table 1. Bank lending to emerging Asia, June 1997-June 19981/
June 
1997
December
1997
June 
1998
European
banks
Billions, US dollars 85,338 87,846 76,820
Percent change since June 1997n.a. 2.9 -10.0
Japanese
banks
Billions, US dollars 97,232 86,651 74,297
Percent change since June 1997n.a. -10.9 -23.6
U.S. banks Billions, US dollars 23,738 21,974 16,566
Percent change since June 1997n.a. -7.4 -30.2
 
1/ Emerging Asia comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.
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Table 2.Banks: Liabilities as a Percent of Borrowers’s Total Liabilities. 1994-1998
Liabilities to the US
Dec-94 Jun-95 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-97 Dec-97 Jun-98 
  Indonesia 7.020 5.680 6.240 7.200 9.510 7.820 8.390 6.420 
  Malaysia 10.176 7.288 9.076 9.433 10.511 8.264 6.487 4.990 
  Philippines 37.408 35.830 35.379 31.042 29.363 19.450 16.336 16.992 
 South Korea 9.695 9.971 9.790 10.885 9.359 9.564 10.119 10.227 
  Thailand 6.131 5.791 6.522 6.387 7.198 5.761 4.304 3.754 
Liabilities to Japan
Dec-94 Jun-95 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-97 Dec-97 Jun-98 
 Indonesia 52.476 50.758 47.103 43.853 39.686 39.421 37.712 37.857 
 Malaysia 43.215 41.373 43.627 40.453 36.925 36.420 31.057 34.334 
 Philippines 13.939 15.591 11.817 12.987 11.724 14.603 13.296 12.964 
 South Korea 30.792 29.223 27.673 25.574 24.335 22.787 21.525 26.136 
 Thailand 60.284 60.869 58.654 54.102 53.495 54.413 56.377 55.811 
Liabilities to Europe
Dec-94 Jun-95 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-97 Dec-97 Jun-98 
 Indonesia 31.253 33.476 33.777 36.661 37.842 38.277 39.862 43.704 
 Malaysia 40.495 44.057 36.947 39.164 41.446 44.000 50.863 47.429 
 Philippines 41.376 40.275 42.020 43.520 47.618 49.363 53.088 60.203 
 South Korea 33.729 34.306 30.455 30.512 33.835 35.568 35.747 38.813 
 Thailand 24.187 24.853 23.730 26.066 27.283 28.546 29.182 32.809 
Note:  Each entry is amount owed by that country to the lender, divided by that country's total debt (grand total).
Europe total includes Spain, UK, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Luxemburg, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France, Finland,
Denmark, Belgium, and Austria.
Source: Bank of International Settlements.
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Table 3. Banks: Liabilities as a Percent of Lender’s Total Liabilities, 1994-1998
Liabilities to US   
Dec-94 Jun-95 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-97 Dec-97 Jun-98 
   Indonesia 2.82 2.63 2.94 3.45 5.59 4.04 4.32 2.95 
   Malaysia 1.58 1.23 1.61 1.84 2.47 2.09 1.58 1.05 
   Philippines 2.95 3.02 3.12 3.26 4.13 2.47 2.84 2.77 
 S o u t h
Korea
6.33 8.15 8.03 9.32 9.90 8.75 8.41 6.78 
  Thailand 3.10 3.55 4.34 4.31 5.34 3.51 2.23 1.61
 
Liabilities to Japan 
Dec-94 Jun-95 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-97 Dec-97 Jun-98 
  Indonesia15.23 15.09 15.14 15.43 15.91 15.58 15.75 15.49 
  Malaysia 4.84 4.48 5.29 5.80 5.93 7.06 6.12 6.44 
  Philippines0.79 0.84 0.71 1.00 1.13 1.42 1.88 1.88 
 S o u t h
Korea
14.47 15.36 15.49 16.06 17.56 15.97 14.51 15.42 
  Thailand 21.96 24.01 26.60 26.79 27.09 25.40 23.74 21.27 
Liabilities to Europe
Dec-94 Jun-95 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-97 Dec-97 Jun-98 
  Indonesia3.22 3.67 4.21 4.79 5.89 5.15 4.65 4.28 
  Malaysia 1.61 1.75 1.74 2.09 2.58 2.90 2.80 2.13 
  Philippines0.83 0.80 0.98 1.24 1.77 1.63 2.09 2.09 
  South
Korea
25.39 28.14 30.12 31.71 43.15 38.77 30.86 22.98 
  Thailand 3.12 3.60 4.18 4.79 5.36 4.53 3.43 2.99 
Notes:  Each entry is the amount owed by that country to the lender, divided by the lender's total outstanding claims
to developing countries, as reported to the BIS.  The total claims of the lenders on developing countries is calculated
as their total outstanding claims less the total claims to developed countries.
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European data includes  Spain, UK, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Luxemburg, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France,
Finland, Denmark, Belgium, and Austria.
Source: Bank of International Settlements.
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Table 4. Trade and Financial Clusters
Country Bank Cluster High-Correlation Cluster Third-Party Trade
Cluster
Bilateral
Trade
Cluster
Japan U.S. Asia Latin
America
Asia Latin
America
Latin
America
Argentina 1 1 1
Bolivia
Brazil 1 1 1 1
Chile 1 1
Colombia 1 1
Denmark
Finland
Indonesia 1
Israel  
Malaysia 1 1
Mexico 1 1 1
Norway
Peru 1
Philippines 1 1 1
South
Korea 1
1 1
Spain
Sweden
Thailand 1 1
Turkey
Uruguay 1 1
Venezuela 1 1
 1 Not part of our sample.
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Table 5. Conditional Probabilities and noise-to-signal ratios for Trade and Financial Clusters
Noise-to-signal
ratio
Bank Cluster High-Correlation
Cluster
Third-Party
Trade Cluster
Bilateral Trade
Cluster
25 to 50 0.90 0.58 1.54 2.34
50 and above 0.07 0.39 0.57 0.08
Weight in
Vulnerability
Index
25 to 50 1.10 1.73 0.64 0.42
50 and above 14.08 2.57 1.75 12.5
P(C*CE)-P©
25 to 50 -3.1 20.8 -6.3 -21.8
50 and above 52.0 47.1 30.7 47.3
Based on  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998)
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Table 6. A contagion vulnerability index
Country Contagion Vulnerability Index
December 1994: Mexican
Crisis
July, 1997: Thai Crisis January, 1999:
Brazilian Crisis
Argentina 16.65 0 29.15
Bolivia 0 0 0
Brazil 18.4 0 n.a.
Chile 0 0 26.58
Colombia 12.5 0 15.83
Denmark 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0
Indonesia 0 16.65 0
Israel 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 28.33 0
Mexico n.a. 0 18.4
Norway 0 0 0
Peru 2.57 0 2.57
Philippines 14.08 4.32 14.08
South Korea 1 0 26.58 0
Spain 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 0
Thailand 0 n.a. 0
Turkey 0 0 0
Uruguay 0 0 26.58
Venezuela 12.5 0 15.83
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Table 7.  Daily Interest Rates: Causality Tests
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South
Korea
Thailand Numbe
r that
are
signifi-
cant 
Indonesia
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 N Y N Y 2
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997 Y N N Y 2
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
N Y Y Y 3
Malaysia
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997Y Y Y N 3
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
N N Y Y 2
Philippines
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 N N N Y 1
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997N Y N N 1
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
Y Y N N 2
South Korea
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997Y Y Y Y 4
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
Y Y N Y 3
Thailand
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 Y N Y N 2
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997N N Y Y 2
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
Y N Y N 2
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Table 8.  Daily Exchange Rate Changes: Causality Tests
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South
Korea
Thailand Number
that are
signifi-
cant
Indonesia
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997 N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 Y N Y N 2
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997 Y N Y N 2
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
N Y Y N 2
Malaysia
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 N N Y N 1
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997N N N N 0
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
N N N Y 1
Philippines
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 Y Y Y Y 4
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997Y Y N Y 3
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
Y Y Y Y 4
South Korea
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 Y N N Y 2
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997Y Y N N 2
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
Y Y Y Y 4
Thailand
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997N N N N 0
 July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 Y Y N Y 3
 July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997Y Y Y Y 4
 November 17, 1997-April 30,
1998
Y N N Y 2
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Appendix Table A.1.  Daily Interest Rates: Causality Tests
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997, 392 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.82
(0.61)
9.33
(0.50)
0.15
(0.99)
1.77
(0.99)
0.51
(0.88)
5.79
(0.83)
0.09
(0.99)
1.03
(0.99)
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.02
(0.43)
11.54
(0.32)
0.45
(0.92)
5.13
(0.88)
1.25
(0.26)
14.10
(0.17)
0.78
(0.64)
8.92
(0.54)
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.31
(0.22)
14.73
(0.14)
0.45
(0.92)
5.18
(0.88)
0.70
(0.73)
7.96
(0.63)
0.55
(0.85)
6.30
(0.79)
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.69 
(0.73)
7.87
(0.64)
1.15
(0.32)
13.04
(0.22)
1.23
(0.26)
13.90
(0.18)
0.43
(0.93)
4.90
(0.90)
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.18
(0.99)
2.02
(0.99)
0.57
(0.84)
6.49
(0.77)
0.46
(0.92)
5.20
(0.88)
1.09
(0.37)
12.31
(0.26)
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
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Appendix Table A.2.  Daily Interest Rates: Causality Tests
July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 334 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.37
(0.95)
4.36
(0.93)
2.44
(0.01)*
27.64
(0.00)*
0.38
(0.95)
4.47
(0.92)
2.34
(0.01)*
26.49
(0.00)*
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.48
(0.90)
5.65
(0.84)
0.68
(0.74)
7.97
(0.63)
0.23
(0.99)
2.74
(0.99)
0.82
(0.61)
9.52
(0.48)
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.49
(0.14)
17.09
(0.07)**
1.24
(0.26)
14.36
(0.16)
0.71
(0.71)
8.29
(0.60)
1.61
(0.10)**
18.46
(0.05)*
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.38 
(0.95)
4.49
(0.92)
0.30
(0.98)
3.57
(0.96)
0.22
(0.99)
2.63
(0.98)
0.30
(0.98)
3.51
(0.97)
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
3.12
(0.00)*
34.93
(0.00)*
0.58
(0.83)
6.80
(0.74)
2.19
(0.02)*
24.91
(0.01)*
0.43
(0.93)
5.09
(0.88)
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
38
Appendix Table A.3.  Daily Interest Rates: Causality Tests
July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997, 99 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.06
(0.41)
19.71
(0.03)*
0.72
(0.70)
13.90
(0.18)
0.48
(0.90)
9.39
(0.50)
1.66
(0.12)
29.42
(0.00)*
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.11
(0.37)
20.68
(0.02)*
1.37
(0.22)
24.78
(0.01)*
1.17
(0.33)
21.28
(0.02)*
0.41
(0.93)
8.19
(0.48)
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.61
(0.80)
11.79
(0.30)
1.52
(0.16)
27.27
(0.00)*
0.46
(0.91)
9.11
(0.52)
0.77
(0.66)
14.66
(0.15)
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.49 
(0.17)
26.69
(0.00)*
1.59
(0.14)
28.30
(0.00)*
1.40
(0.21)
25.37
(0.01)*
1.10
(0.38)
20.36
(0.03)*
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.79
(0.64)
15.02
(0.13)
0.64
(0.77)
12.35
(0.26)
1.68
(0.11)
29.78
(0.00)*
1.73
(0.10)**
30.44
(0.00)*
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
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Appendix Table A.4.  Daily Interest Rates: Causality Tests
November 17, 1997-April 30, 1998, 119 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.47
(0.90)
8.01
(0.63)
1.71
(0.10)**
26.65
(0.00)*
1.31
(0.24)
20..95
(0.02)*
1.84
(0.07)**
28.55
(0.00)*
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.47
(0.90)
7.93
(0.64)
0.19
(0.99)
3.23
(0.97)
1.19
(0.32)
19.12
(0.04)*
1.18
(0.32)
18.99
(0.04)*
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.17
(0.33)
18.92
(0.04)*
1.34
(0.22)
21.34
(0.02)*
1.08
(0.39)
17.62
(0.06)**
1.04
(0.42)
17.00
(0.07)**
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
3.72 
(0.00)*
51.99
(0.00)*
1.17
(0.33)
18.89
(0.04)*
1.06
(0.41)
17.20
(0.07)**
1.58
(0.13)
24.84
(0.01)*
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
2.49
(0.01)*
37.11
(0.00)*
0.57
(0.83)
9.65
(0.47)
1.52
(0.15)
23.94
(0.01)*
1.13
(0.35)
18.281
(0.05)*
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
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Appendix Table A.5.  Daily Exchange Rate Changes: Causality Tests
 January 1, 1996-July 1, 1997, 392 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.71
(0.71)
8.03
(0.63)
0.50
(0.89)
5.71
(0.84)
0.51
(0.88) 
5.83
(0.83)
0.71
(0.71)
8.13
(0.62)
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.38
(0.19)
15.54
(0.11)
0.58
(0.83)
6.65
(0.76)
0.83
(0.60)
9.38
(0.50)
0.68
(0.74)
7.74
(0.65)
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.11
(0..35)
12.58
(0.25)
0.93
(0.50)
10.55
(0.39)
0.89
(0.54)
10.11
(0.43)
1.54
(0.12)
17.36
(0.07)**
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.48
(0.90)
5.52
(0.85)
 0.78
(0.64)
8.90
(0.54)
0.97
(0.46)
11.01
(0.36)
 0.45
(0.92)
5.16
(0.88)
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.17
(0.99)
1.91
(0.99)
0.73
(0.70)
8.29
(0.60)
1.41
(0.17)
15.86
(0.10)**
0.93
(0.51)
10.47
(0.40)
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
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Appendix Table A.6.  Daily Exchange Rate Changes: Causality Tests
July 2, 1997-July 1, 1999 334 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.95
(0.04)*
21.22
(0.02)*
1.07
(0.39)
11.67
(0.31)
3.19
(0.00)*
34.17
(0.00)*
0.85
(0.59)
9.29
(0.51)
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.09
(0.37)
11.98
(0.29)
1.08
(0.38)
11.83
(0.30)
1.89
(0.04)*
20.57
(0.02)*
1.27
(0.25)
13.85
(0.18)
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.74
(0.07)**
18.94
(0.04)*
2.79
(0.00)*
30.00
(0.00)*
4.07
(0.00)*
43.22
(0.00)*
3.18
(0.00)*
34.08
(0.00)*
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.87
(0.05)*
20.28
(0.03)*
1.36
(0.19)
14.85
(0.14)
0.97
(0.47)
11.01
(0.36)
0.45
(0.92)
5.16
(0.88)
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
3.58
(0.00)*
38.24
(0.00)*
3.03
(0.00)*
32.57
(0.00)*
1.41
(0.17)
15.42
(0.12)
3.62
(0.00)*
38.68
(0.00)*
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
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Appendix Table A.7.  Daily Exchange Rate Changes: Causality Tests
July 2, 1997-November 16, 1997, 99 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.11
(0.38)
20.53
(0.02)*
0.76
(0.66)
14.61
(0.15)
1.67
(0.12)
29.56
(0.01)*
0.83
(0.61)
15.71
(0.11)
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.49
(0.89)
9.64
(0.47)
0.25
(0.99)
5.00
(0.89)
0.57
(0.83)
11.06
(0.35)
0.53
(0.86)
10.34
(0.41)
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.13
(0.35)
20.99
(0.02)*
1.66
(0.12)
29.47
(0.00)*
0.66
(0.75)
12.80
(0.23)
4.06
(0.00)*
60.63
(0.00)*
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
2.15
(0.04)*
36.67
(0.00)*
1.93
(0.06)
33.51
(0.00)*
0.97
(0.49)
18.14
(0.05)*
0.62
(0.79)
12.00
(0.29)
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.87
(0.07)**
32.5
(0.00)*
1.59
(0.14)
28.31
(0.02)*
1.29
(0.26)
23.63
(0.01)*
2.17
(0.04)*
36.96
(0.00)*
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
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Appendix Table A.8.  Daily Exchange Rate Changes: Causality Tests
November 17, 1997-April 30, 1998, 119 observations
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Thailand
Indonesia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.77
(0.66)
12.71
(0.24)
1.28
(0.26)
20.51
(0.02)*
1.44
(0.18)
22.84
(0.01)*
0.53
(0.87)
8.88
(0.54)
Malaysia
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
0.75
(0.68)
12.45
(0.26)
0.38
(0.95)
6.54
(0.77)
0.57
(0.83)
9.62
(0.47)
1.24
(0.28)
19.88
(0.03)*
Philippines
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
2.58
(0.01)*
38,22
(0.00)*
2.62
(0.01)*
38.82
(0.00)*
2.19
(0.03)*
33.16
(0.00)*
1.24
(0.28)
19.90
(0.03)*
South Korea
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.99
(0.05)*
30.48
(0.00)*
1.43
(0.19)
22.65
(0.01)*
1.94
(0.05)*
29.90
(0.00)*
2.93
(0.00)*
42.67
(0.00)*
Thailand
F-Statistic 
(probability)
Log Likelihood 
(probability)
1.40
(0.20)
22.25
(0.01)*
0.82
(0.61)
13.57
(0.19)
0.75
(0.68)
12.42
(0.26)
1.36
(0.22)
21.68
(0.02)*
* Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
